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I'

DIVINE ACTION IN A WORLD CHAOS:
AN EVALUATION OF JOHN POLKINGHORNE'S
MODEL OF SPECIAL DIVINE ACTION
Steven D. Crain
John Polkinghorne, formerly a physicist and now an Anglican priest and
theologian, has made a significant contribution to the current dialogue
between Christian theology and the natural sciences. I examine here his
reflection on what is commonly called the problem of special divine action
in the world. Polkinghorne argues that God acts in the world via a "topdown" or "downward" mode of causation that exploits the indeterministic
openness of chaotic systems without requiring that God violate natural
laws. In response, I argue: (1) that divine intervention in response to human
sin is theologically, as well as scientifically unobjectionable; and (2) that the
belief that God is the transcendent creator of the world renders the "causal
joint" between God and the world metaphysical in nature, thus obviating
the need to uncover a physical feature of the world that God exploits in
order to act in the world.

John Polkinghorne is one of many scientists contributing to a growing
body of literature that explores the interrelationships between science
and Christian theology. After retiring from professional activity as a
mathematical physicist, he sought ordination in the Church of England,
whereupon he served as vicar of a country parish for some years before
returning to an academic setting. Now, as President of Queens' College,
Cambridge, he devotes much energy to his work on theology and science
in books and papers that span the whole range of metaphysical and epistemological issues central to the current dialogue. Broadly speaking, he is
trying to construct a new natural theology, one informed by contemporary science that demonstrates the consistency and coherence between
the practice and findings of the natural sciences and "the substance of
Christian orthodoxy."! One particular topic on which he has labored is
the subject of divine action in the world. Drawing on recent work in
chaos theory, Polkinghorne explores how the belief that God acts within
the created order might be conceived in a way acceptable to the scientific
mind, which, he argues, resists the notion that the laws of nature would
ever be suspended or violated, and acceptable as well to the theologian
concerned to elaborate an adequate concept of the freedom of creation.
My paper evaluates some key aspects of Polkinghorne's work on divine
action. The reader will discover that he addresses many questions of
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interest to the philosophical theologian and philosopher of science. 2
Polkinghorne's arguments concerning divine action can be analyzed
as follows:
(1) God performs particular acts within the created order.
That is, in addition to the comprehensive act of creation and
conservation, God is "specially active" in the world, responding,
for example, to the needs of personal beings expressed in prayer.
(2) God performs these particular acts without interfering
with the operation of natural laws, i.e., without performing miracles, a notion with which the scientific mind is uncomfortable,
but, more importantly, to which there are important theological
objections.
(3) God's special activity must be understood so as to avoid
committing the religious believer to what is typically known as
the "God of the gaps." This means that God's special activity
must not be located in "gaps" in the contemporary scientific
account of the world. For history suggests that such gaps
inevitably close with the progress of science.
(4) In virtue of satisfying the preceding criteria, a promising
model of special divine action holds that God acts in the world via
a "top-down" or "downward" mode of causation that exploits the
indeterministic openness of complex dynamical systems.

In the following I will examine and then evaluate these arguments. I will
proceed by developing each of the preceding four points and then offer
extensive critical commentary.
I

According to Polkinghorne, to deny special divine activity would
strike at the heart of the Christian conviction that God is "personal." A
personal God freely responds to individual personal need, thereby evoking a free response in turn on the part of human beings. 3 The divine
response can take many forms: calling, convicting, healing, reproving,
consoling, forgiving, demanding, inviting. God's action - if discerned can in turn evoke gratitude, puzzlement, praise, anger, hope, contrition,
sorrow, joy. The objects evoking these responses are events or sequences
of events interpreted as meaningful, i.e., as bearing the impress of divine
purpose for the ongoing relationship between God and human beings.
Hence, the belief that events fall out one way and not another at least in
part because God has freely acted in one way as opposed to another is
essential to the daily living out of the Christian faith. Moreover, in its
doctrinal structure, Christianity is supremely a religion dependent on
the claim that God is active in the world. For at the heart of the Christian
faith lies the fundamental divine "act" upon which hinges the salvation
of the world, namely, the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus of
Nazareth. Therefore, any model of divine activity that limits God's
action merely to creating the universe and conserving it in being, such as
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Maurice Wiles' model of creation as a single, complex divine act, must
be rejected as incompatible with Christian faith and practice. 4
II

Polkinghorne grants that in order to respond to the individual needs
of creatures, God possesses the power to interfere with the operation of
natural laws - to perform miracles in the traditional sense - but argues
that it is unfitting for God to use such power when acting within the created order. For as creator, God upholds the laws of nature in the first
place: they are an expression of the divine will. If God proceeds to suspend or otherwise interfere with the operation of these laws, then,
Polkinghorne contends, God would be acting contrary to God's own
will, in a sense undoing an aspect of creation in an attempt to "fix" what
God could not "get right" in the first place. Moreover, a God whose special activity is thus sporadic or intermittent would be inconsistent and
undependable. Such a God could not be depended on to act in a rationally coherent way, but would rather resemble a magician or conjurer
performing tricks at whim. Indeed, the theologian who argues that God
interferes with natural laws must then confront an especially difficult
form of the problem of evil: why does God not violate the laws of nature
more often in order to alleviate the suffering of creatures? For a God
who acts sporadically comes to the rescue of some while unaccountably
withholding divine help from others. Polkinghorne rejects such a picture
of divine action. God's action must rather be conceived as continuous
and wholly rational, as befits the unconditional trust the believer
bestows on God. The laws of nature are therefore inviolable.'
According to Polkinghorne, in this way the reliable operation of natural laws reflects the faithfulness of God. But the inviolability of natural
law expresses divine faithfulness in another sense as well. God is faithful, not only in acting consistently, but also in granting to all creation
that degree of autonomy befitting a "partner" with which God freely
relates. That is, in an important sense, freedom characterizes God's relationship to all creation insofar as the universe as a whole exists as God's
partner in a free relationship. In this context, by "freedom"
Polkinghorne means the freedom of all created being - of the universe in
its entirety - to be itself, to be what God has created it to be. Since the
natures of created things are at least in part defined by the laws which
govern their interrelationships, to interfere with the operation of these
laws - to overrule, in other words, what helps make the entire order of
created things what it is - therefore violates the freedom of creation. 6 In
sum then, from a theological perspective, one is as strongly motivated to
deny that God interferes with natural laws as to assert that God performs particular acts within the created order. Hence, although as a scientist, Polkinghorne shares the basic intuition of the "scientific mind"
that the laws of nature operate without fail in all circumstances, his
rejection of miracles in the traditional sense does not follow from slavish
adherence to the intellectual spirit of the age, but from fundamental theological convictions.
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III
According to Polkinghorne, therefore, the contemporary Christian
theologian must chart a course between a "deistic" rejection of special
divine action, and the equally unacceptable affirmation that God interferes with natural laws. Moreover, in so doing, the theologian must not
repeat an error especially common in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when God was conceived to act in the world precisely in those
contexts where explanations in terms of natural laws were thought
unlikely or impossible.
Charles Darwin is credited with undermining a widely popular version of this natural theology in the nineteenth century: the notion that
evidence for special acts of divine creation can be found in the marvelous diversity of living things and in the exquisite adaptation of
organisms to their environment. For Darwin offered a plausible account
- or at least the core of such an account - that explains how nature herself
could produce such tremendous diversity among living things so wonderfully adapted. That is, he argued that the laws of nature alone can
account for biological diversity and fitness, without need for particular
divine activity in the form of special creation. What had been considered
a "gap" in the scientific account of the world was now "filled."
Moreover, in the wake of the Origin of Species, a consensus developed
that Darwin had undermined the entire approach to natural theology
whereby one attempts to locate God's special activity within such
"gaps" in the scientific account of the world.
Polkinghorne approves of the downfall of the "God of the gaps," for
as the Darwin episode dramatically illustrates, the God-of-the-gaps natural theology is inherently unstable, since in order to prevail it depends
on certain scientific advances not being made. The practice of science and
the conviction that God acts in the world therefore collide, with the result
that when the relevant scientific advances do happen, they then appear
to send the believer into retreat before the steady progress of science. The
"God of the gaps" is thus, so to speak, "squeezed" out of the world, and
faith in God's ability, or willingness, to act in the world is undermined.
Hence, Polkinghorne argues that no acceptable conception of special
divine activity ought to depend on temporary scientific ignorance. 7
To summarize, then, Polkinghorne's position on divine action to this
point: God performs particular acts within the created order without
violating natural laws and without operating under cover, so to speak,
of phenomena for which scientists only temporarily lack explanations in
terms of natural laws. Polkinghorne exploits recent developments in the
new physics, specifically in the study of complex dynamical systems
("chaos" theory), in order to develop his model of divine action.
IV

Polkinghorne argues that special divine activity would violate the
integrity of creation if the world were a deterministic mechanism governed by the laws of classical physics. For in order for God to act in a
Newtonian world, God would have to break or suspend the operation of
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natural laws. Polkinghorne views the Newtonian world as a "closed"
and "rigid" structure wherein at any given time all events are pre-determined to occur by the laws of nature and the state of the universe at any
given time in the past. The Newtonian world is therefore not "open" to
special divine activity of a non-invasive sort - for any such activity
would entail God's tampering with some deterministic law or laws in
order to bring about what otherwise would not have occurred had this
law or these laws been in force.
However, Polkinghorne argues that the "new physics" has overthrown the deterministic, mechanistic Newtonian worldview. The world
is no longer seen to be a rigid, closed structure. The world is open, for
the past does not rigorously determine the future, since at any time "t,"
any number of possible futures are compatible with the state of the universe and its laws. Why? Because we now know that a significant number of natural laws are indeterministic, namely, in the micro-realm, the
laws of quantum mechanics, and in the macro-realm, the newly-discovered laws of chaotic systems. s Polkinghorne suggests that God exploits
this openness, especially in the macro-realm - the realm of our experience - in order to act providentially in the world. 9
How does God exploit indeterminism, especially of a macroscopic
variety, in order to act in the world? In brief, Polkinghorne argues that
"downwardly" acting causal powers can "emerge" in indeterministic
systems - especially those studied by the new science of "chaos" - and
that in virtue of this possibility, an indeterministic world is open to noninterventive divine action. A few words of explanation are in order,
although Polkinghorne himself admits that his thoughts here are meant
to be suggestive of a fruitful direction in which to look for light on the
problem of divine action, rather than a model worked out in comprehensive detail.
An "emergent" of a system is a power or property obtaining at the
level of the whole whose operation cannot be fully explained in terms of
the powers or properties of the system's constituents. That is, an emergent power or property is "wholistic" - it cannot be "reduced to" the
powers or properties of the system's parts. For example, one can claim
that powers or properties obtaining at the level of the brain-as-a-whole
are irreducible to the powers or properties of its constituent neurons.
"Downward causality" is an example of an emergent power, one emerging in certain complex "chaotic" - and therefore indeterministic - systems. A downwardly-active causal power is an irreducible power that a
system-as-a-whole has to influence the states of that system's parts by
exploiting the indeterminism obtaining on the lower ontological level of
the system. It is therefore as if the system considered as a whole is a
causal entity impinging on the system's parts, such that the causal contribution of the system-as-a-whole must be taken into account just as are
the causal contributions of external entities and the causal interactions
governed by the indeterministic laws holding on the level of the parts.
Polkinghorne conceives of this wholistic causal contribution in terms of
a "top-down" non-energetic "input" of "information" that determines
on the lower level what the laws obtaining on this level otherwise leave
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undetermined. The system considered as a whole thereby "selects" for
the system one from among many of the evolutionary paths allowed by
the applicable indeterministic laws.1O
The relationship obtaining between an emergent, wholistic, downwardly-active causal power and the laws governing a system's parts
provides the key component of Polkinghorne's model for non-interventive divine action in the world. For a wholistic causal power, because it
acts non-energetically on (and therefore under cover of, so to speak) the
indeterministic processes at a system's lower ontological levels, influences the behavior of the system's parts without violating the laws governing the behavior of the parts. Hence, the downwardly active causal
power acts on the system's constituents with a degree of autonomy, yet
without in any way interrupting the laws governing the behavior of the
parts. In sum, such a causal power acts non-invasively to affect the
states of the system's constituents. In view of this, Polkinghorne suggests that God acts downwardly in the world by exploiting and thereby
working "under cover of" the indeterministic openness obtaining
throughout the world's various ontologicallevels."
The model gains credibility, he suggests, by considering that free
human action may well depend on our exploiting indeterministic·
dynamical systems in our own bodies. In other words, that we can act
freely in the world suggests how God can act freely as well. For if one
rejects various dualistic solutions to the mind-body problem, as
Polkinghorne does, then one must look for ways in which human agents
can escape being trapped, as it were, by chains of causality in the natural
world that would otherwise determine human actions. Hence,
Polkinghorne speculates, by exploiting indeterminism in the world, both
divine and human agents find means for acting freely in a world governed by naturallaws. 12 Although God is thus conceived to act in the
indeterministic "gaps" of the world, Polkinghorne argues that he is not
thereby committing himself to the "God of the gaps" of nineteenth-century natural theology, for the gaps in and through which free action
occurs are built into the world itself: they are not products of temporary
scientific ignorance.
Polkinghorne uses his model to address the problem of evil: God's
activity is constrained in that the world's openness allows limited room
for divine maneuver, a limitation that God must respect in order to
respect the freedom and integrity of creation. To see this, consider the
analogous case of the brain interacting with its own neurons. The stateof-the-brain-as-a-whole cannot cause its neurons to assume just any set
of neuronal states at a time lit." Presumably, what neuronal states are
accessible depends on the neuronal states at time lit-I," as well as on the
state-of-the-brain-as-a-whole at "t-l," as well as on the states of any
intervening subsystems between the wholistic state and the brain's neurons (i.e., the states of any emergent sub-systems). Hence, by extension,
one can envision numerous constraints on God's downward activity in
the world: not just any state of affairs can be brought about at time "t."
Hence, God cannot prevent or otherwise influence every evil if God is
constrained to act via downward causation.
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v
This, then, in rough outline, is Polkinghorne's analysis of the problem
of divine action and his proposed model, a model which, again, he himself admits is not a proposal worked out in fine detail. He does include
enough detail, however, to warrant careful study, for in constructing his
model he raises a number of important issues that any study of divine
action must address, many of which concern his basic motivation for
designing the model along the lines that he has. I begin my evaluation,
then, not by examining the model itself, but by taking up one of these
preliminary issues, namely, the topic of the "God of the gaps." As we
have seen, one of Polkinghorne's major concerns has been to understand
how God acts in the world without becoming in the process a "God of
the gaps." I will argue for an alternative way of thinking about the relationship between special divine activity and the practice of science than
that Polkinghorne has proposed.
As we have seen, Polkinghorne rejects both the traditional concept of
miracle and the God of the gaps. Although he does not, to my knowledge, argue that these notions stand or fall together, it will prove helpful
to ask whether and how one might affirm that God occasionally interferes with the operation of natural laws in response to personal need, and
yet still deny that God's special activity should be located within gaps in
the scientific account of the world. For on the one hand, I agree with
Polkinghorne that theologians ought eschew the God of the gaps, yet I
also argue that a Christian seeking to adhere to the "substance of
Christian orthodoxy" is strongly motivated to find acceptable the traditional notion of miracle, since the miracle central to the Christian gospel,
the resurrection of Jesus, at least prima facie appears to involve interference with natural laws. (Polkinghorne, I hasten to add, affirms the bodily
resurrection of Christ, but in the context of an alternative understanding
of this and other miracles. 13 ) I will respond to Polkinghorne's theological
objections to miracles conceived as violations of natural law later. For
now, I will seek to justify my claim that, at least with respect to the practice of science, one can consistently affirm the traditional concept of miracle and still reject the God of the gaps, once, that is, the latter is properly
understood. The comments that follow will be seen to have implications
for Polkinghorne's overall approach to special divine action.
My argument is as follows. One can call a single event "miraculous"
without pitting the practice of science against one's conviction that God
is specially active in the world. This is so because, with one important
exception to be considered below, the practice of science does not
require that every event be scientifically explicable, i.e., explicable in
terms of the operation of natural laws. Consider the belief that a patient
has miraculously recovered from an illness, i.e., recovered in such a
way that religious believers argue no scientific explanation for the recovery is possible. Although one can demand that, in principle, the "scientific account of the world" must include explanations for all events including apparently miraculous ones - one cannot do so on empirical
grounds. By this I mean that the actual practice of a science like medi-
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cine only demands that a given class of phenomena be explicable in
terms of natural laws. For scientists seek answers to questions that are
general in scope, questions like the following: What causes continental
drift? How do stars generate their energy? Why does a certain drug slow
the growth of pancreatic tumors? With an important exception to be
considered below, it is in addressing questions of this kind that science
constructs its account of the world, what I am calling "the scientific
account of the world." When sciences like medicine encounter events
that religious believers claim are miraculous, they can, and do, write off
such events as simply anomalous (if not necessarily miraculous) without
having to seek an explanation for the event in terms of natural laws: the
profession can simply, as it were, move on without violating its methodological canons. It is thus incumbent on scientists to recognize that only
on non-empirical grounds, for example, on the basis of a materialist
metaphysic, can one demand that science in principle must explain all
events. Of course, an event thought to be miraculous can, on reconsideration, turn out to be scientifically explicable after all, perhaps in terms of
a newly discovered natural law, and when this happens, religious
believers are required to retract their claims that a miracle has occurred.
I will return to this possibility momentarily. But the practice of science
does not demand that, in principle, all claims about the miraculous be
explained away in this manner.
The practice of science is compatible with single events going unexplained scientifically, be they, for example, miraculous healings, or
indeed even resurrections from the dead, because a universe whose natural laws are only occasionally interrupted still in general exhibits lawlike behavior, so that general classes of phenomena remain open to scientific investigation. Indeed, from a theological perspective, this is simply to affirm that for the most part, natural laws operate without fail,
except on those rare occasions when God interferes with that operation.
For this reason, in order to avoid conflict with science, religious believers ought limit their claims about special divine action to isolated single
events. To rely on special divine action to address questions of general
scope, i.e., to account for classes of phenomena (like stellar energy production) necessarily commits one to the God of the gaps, because it is
precisely by answering such questions in terms of natural laws that science builds its account of the world. On the other hand, to claim that
God has intervened on isolated single occasions does not, on my use of
the term "the God of the gaps," necessarily commit a religious believer
to the belief that a "gap" exists in the scientific account of the world
within which God is specially active. (It might: I will try to resolve this
question later.) For the same reason, if forced to revise her claims about,
for example, a putative miraculous healing because of a new discovery,
it would be improper to say that a "gap" in the scientific account of the
world has been closed, forcing the believer to "retreat" before scientific
progress. Claims about the miraculous will necessarily have this untoward effect only from the perspective of a materialist or naturalistic
metaphysic that rules out the miraculous in principle.
Hence, on this account, one way to explain how nineteenth-century
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natural theology erred would be to say that it posited special divine
action as the answer to what, in virtue of its generality, was properly a
scientific question, namely the question, Why are living organisms so
diverse and wonderfully adapted to their environments? In this case,
unlike that where a particular healing is called miraculous, religious
believers did indeed contend that a "gap" existed in the scientific
account of the world, and therefore inevitably they come into conflict
with science and eventually "retreated" before its progress. One could
then argue that if in the nineteenth century proponents of special divine
creation had limited their claims to isolated, occasional events of divine
intervention, rather than trying to explain the entire general shape of the
biological world in terms of special divine activity, we would not accuse
them of having committed themselves to the God of the gaps.
To this last possibility, however, evolutionary biologists today would
object. For my argument to this point had depended on claiming that
science ultimately addresses questions of general scope, rather than
seeking explanations of, or involving, single events. Evolutionary biology, however, represents an important exception to this claim that must
now be considered. For it, and other sciences, like cosmology, that
reconstruct cosmic history often seek explanations of or involving single
events. For example, cosmologists working with the big-bang model
seek to understand the event or events that led to the breakdown of various symmetries in the early universe, such as that between matter and
anti-matter. Sciences like cosmology might be called "historical," not
because they treat human history, but because they employ explanations
that are "historical" in form, i.e., their explanations are essentially narratives that make reference to natural laws. As a result, the "historical" sciences inevitably engage in conflict with religious believers over explanations involving single isolated events.
For example, consider the possibility, as many biologists do, that life
on earth began with a complex biochemical reaction occurring at a given
time in a given location, although to date science has failed to offer a
compelling, detailed account for the origin of life. In this case, one could
argue, and indeed some have, that God interfered with natural laws in
order to cause this - but only this - single event, and thereby to bring into
being the first living organism. Evolutionary biology today cannot tolerate such a claim, for its method is to seek explanations for the origin and
development of life exclusively in terms of natural laws. Hence, although
in this case the religious believer has attributed only a single, isolated
event to special divine action, open conflict with science inevitably
results that looks all the world like an argument over a putative "gap" in
the scientific account of the world. In this case, one could amend my previous discussion and add that where "historical" sciences such as evolutionary biology or cosmology are concerned, any claims about miraculous
intervention, even if involving only single events, commit religious
believers to the God of the gaps, and therefore must be avoided.
An alternative response is possible, however. One could argue that
the situation just envisioned is simply analogous to the case of a miraculous healing, and therefore no more objectionable with respect to the
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practice of science than that case proved to be. Hence, even if God did
miraculously create the first living organism, evolutionary biologists
could still go about doing science. For once again, a single event's slipping through the grasp of science - even one as crucial as the origin of
life - would not render the universe a chaotic jumble impenetrable to
human reason. Biologists in this case would still have much work to do
investigating the evolution of life, just as medical science would continue to experiment with cancer drugs even if it reached a consensus that a
certain patient had miraculously recovered from pancreatic cancer. On
the other hand, if the believer were mistaken and life's origin could be
scientifically explained, then the believer need not cower before the
advance of science, as if science were "squeezing" God and divine activity from the world. It would simply become necessary for the believer to
revise her beliefs regarding God's special responsibility for the single
event in question. Hence, if conflict between science and theology results
over the origin of life, it is no more harmful to religious belief than conflict over the explanation of a mysterious healing. Postulating miraculous divine interventions in cosmic history only wreaks havoc for religious belief when these interventions are conceived to occur on a wide
scale, as was the case in the Darwin episode, and therefore only in such
instances ought the pejorative phrase "God of the gaps" find application, if, in light of this discussion, it still remains a useful term at all.
The preceding response is, I believe, quite rational. Short of rejecting
any kind of divine interference with natural laws, as Polkinghorne does,
this response allows the theologian to apply consistently the rule developed earlier: to avoid commitment to the God of the gaps, attribute only
isolated single events to miraculous intervention. Yet, however the
Christian might perceive the situation, the community of evolutionary
biologists, for example, objects to any defense for the notion that God
miraculously created earth's first life form. For, again, evolutionary biologists investigating the origins of life seek to reconstruct the history of
life in terms of the relevant natural laws. Those scientists who reject this
presupposition cannot get their work published in reputable journals;
they are ostracized by their scientific community.
Religious believers ought to ask whether they should follow biologists in responding this way to the idea of miraculous interventions in
the history of life, and if so what theological justification they might
have for affirming on the one hand that sciences like cosmology and
evolutionary biology, which reconstruct cosmic history, legitimately
reject the possibility of miraculous divine action in that history, and for
affirming, on the other, that God might miraculously intervene in the
affairs of human beings. Recall that Polkinghorne finds miracles theologically objectionable because they imply that God returns to the scene
of creation, so to speak, in order to "fix" it, and indeed doing so by
seemingly contradicting the very divine intention responsible for the
existence of the relevant natural laws in the first place. Moreover, he
argues that miraculous interventions violate the freedom of creation to
be what God created it to be, which is, I believe, to say that miracles violate the integrity of the natural order, an integrity that depends on the
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uniform operation of natural laws. Finally, he argues that the problem of
evil becomes especially difficult for those who believe that God interferes with natural laws: why does God not intervene more often? A God
who intervenes miraculously in human history appears capricious and
undependable. I will now respond to these arguments (delaying for the
moment discussion of the problem of evil) in order in turn to argue that
claims about miraculous interventions of the sort that evolutionary biologists reject are likewise theologically suspect, but that claims about
miraculous interventions on behalf of human beings are not only scientifically tolerable, but theologically acceptable as well.
r take up first the notion of the integrity and freedom of creation and
ask, Does creation's freedom and integrity, as Polkinghorne suggests,
consist primarily in God's not interfering with the operation of natural
laws? And secondly, would such interference constitute both an internal
inconsistency within the divine will and a divine return to the scene of
creation, as it were, to repair what might have been created properly in
the first place? First, it must be recognized that neither Polkinghorne nor
I claim to have unique insight into the divine will, as if it were open to
scientific or philosophical investigation. All arguments here depend on
our halting and quite fallible sense of what is "fitting," given what we
do know of God and the world. Second, I remind the reader that
Polkinghorne does not deny that God acts in special ways in the world,
even in ways that deserve to be called miraculous. What he questions is
whether in so doing, God ever interferes with natural laws.
My basic response to Polkinghorne's arguments depends on distinguishing between two contexts in cosmic history, one involving the existence of personal beings, the other not.14 Where personal beings are
absent, I argue that it is fitting for God to refrain from interfering with
natural laws, but where they are present, it seems theologically justifiable that God might so interfere. The difference turns on how creation's
freedom and integrity ought be understood in the two different contexts.
In the context of personal beings, I argue that miraculous interference
with natural laws would not violate the freedom and integrity of creation, whereas in a context where personal beings are not present, miracles so understood would not seem appropriate.
I begin by reflecting briefly on the notion of miracle itself. Of course,
Scripture is neutral on the metaphysical status of miracles, whether they
constitute interference with natural laws or not, not least because the
concept "law of nature" is, technically, a creation of the scientific revolution. But beginning with the Old Testament and continuing on into the
New and into the early Church, miracles perform two different functions. First, a miracle represents a crux, a "wonder" -inspiring turning
point in the course of events: but for the miracle, things would have
turned out otherwise in some significant way. Second, a miraculous
event follows from God's desire and intent that an unfolding story take
this unexpected turn. As such, a miracle, already having inspired wonder, then demands to be interpreted in terms of God's intentions.
Miracles thus functions as "signs" to be read, as the Gospel of John
specifically refers to the miracles of Jesus. Miracles thereby become spe-
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cial vehicles of God's personal communion with human beings.
Consider, then, the question whether miraculous interference with
natural laws would be appropriate in contexts not involving human
beings, say during the early history of our planet just prior to the origin
of life. I argue that in this context, miracles are not fitting because they
cannot fulfill what one might call their "sign" function in a context where
no personal beings are present to witness them and interpret their meaning. Although one might claim that God expects personal beings to interpret miraculous events in retrospect, this would presuppose that they
could discover such events in the first place. But given that an event like
the miraculous origin of life could only be "seen," as it were, as a single,
isolated lacuna in the scientific account of the world, its discovery would
be difficult and controversial, indeed far more controversial than claims
that, for example, witnesses had encountered a man risen from the dead.
One can still inquire, however, whether it would be fitting for miraculous intervention to serve at least the first function, that of providing a
turning point in cosmic history - whether discoverable or not - in, for
example, causing life to begin where otherwise it would not have. This is
equivalent to asking whether God might fail to build into cosmic
processes the potential to produce life apart from such interference, or
whether even if God did provide such potential, God would still miraculously interfere with cosmic process on a given particular occasion. God
might do so in order to guarantee that life develop despite the unfolding
of a sequence of events that threatens to frustrate the in-built potential
for life, or in order to guarantee that life develop at a particular time and
place where otherwise it would not have.
In this particular context, where as yet no personal beings exist, I do
indeed agree with Polkinghorne that miraculous intervention seems
unfitting. For in such a context, God can accomplish the divine will by
means of natural laws without confronting self-conscious rebellion
against the purposes of the creator. Atoms cannot so rebel, nor can
galaxies, nor complex organic molecules, nor again arational living
organisms. Of course, possessing distinct natures, different entities
respond in diverse ways to the forces God's creative act sets at work,
and therefore God's purposes can neither be executed instantaneously,
nor even in what might be called" a straight line." Galaxies are
destroyed, species go extinct, and apparently promising lines of development come to a halt. But not needing to respond to sinful rebellion,
there seems no compelling reason for God to interfere miraculously with
the course of events. I say this because I accept Polkinghorne's arguments concerning the freedom and integrity of creation to a point, namely, that, all other things being equal, God shows love and respect for the
God-given natures and causal powers of created things by not miraculously intervening in cosmic processes, and therefore by working
patiently, as it were, within the limitations of the materials chosen. In
this context, then, I agree that it is fitting for God to demonstrate respect
for the "freedom and integrity" of creation by not interfering with the
operation of natural laws. The long, complex unfolding of cosmic history that science has uncovered gives powerful witness to this divine

DIVINE ACTION IN A WORLD OF CHAOS

53

respect for creation's freedom and integrity.
Once, however, rational beings enter the scene of cosmic history,
then, I argue, the means by which God respects the freedom and integrity of creation necessarily changes. For at this point, it finally becomes
possible not only for creation to relate to its creator self-consciously and
therefore personally, but also for it self-consciously to rebel against the
creator's purposes. Whereas in the previous context I argued that God
respects creation's freedom and integrity precisely by not interfering
with natural laws, in this new context creation's freedom and integrity
depend on God's responding appropriately to agents possessing moral
responsibility who can and do abuse this gift. At minimum, God's
response must not undermine the moral responsibility of free creatures.
But what can be said about the status of natural laws in this context?
Must they still be viewed as inviolable?
One could argue that a miraculous act would violate creation's freedom and integrity just as much in this new context as in the old and for
the same reason, namely, by interfering with the operation of God-given
causal powers of created things and therefore violating that degree of
autonomy befitting God's created "other." I argue, however, otherwise.
For here, in this new context, the "integrity" of creation refers not simply
to its relative autonomy from God, as required for it to be God's partner,
but also, and more importantly, to the "wholeness" that creation is
intended to achieve when it attains its divinely-intended end. That is,
the integrity of creation ultimately depends on creation's reaching its
final goal: consummation in a "face-to-face" personal relationship, to
cite the Apostle Paul, wherein creation itself is taken up into union with
God. When personal beings are present, therefore, creation's freedom
and integrity depend on God's so responding to sinful rebellion that creation achieves that end for which God creates a semi-autonomous partner in the first place. Therefore, from the perspective of creation's final
goal, when personal beings abuse their gift of freedom through sin, they
compromise the "integrity" of creation by placing its end in peril. The
divine response to sin in the form of miraculous activity therefore does
not constitute an "adjustment" to creation that thereby spoils creation's
integrity, nor an internal contradiction in the divine will, but rather an
answer to what has become of creation in light of sin. To put the point
another way, miracles do not constitute an adjustment to creation, but
an aspect of what the Apostle Paul calls the "new" creation. Indeed, that
a miracle violates natural law is itself a sign indicating the depths to
which sin spoils the integrity of the created order, for in the wake of sin,
God re-creates that order to its very roots, all the way down to the naturallaws that for so long had operated without interference.
I conclude therefore that, properly qualified, the belief that God acts
in the world occasionally by means of violating natural laws is acceptable from the perspective of the practice of science. Furthermore, at least
tentatively I conclude that the belief is theologically acceptable as well,
at least in light of the preceding theological reflection on the relationship
between miracles, human sin, and the ultimate goal of creation. I have
not yet addressed all of Polkinghorne's objections to this notion insofar
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as I have not evaluated his discussion of the problem of evil. I will delay
doing so until examining the details of his model for divine action.
Based on the preceding discussion, I can say, however, that I do not find
Polkinghorne's model for divine action compelling simply insofar as it
allows for God to act in the world without violating natural laws. I now
turn to the specifics of the model itself.
Vi

Pol king horne claims that special divine activity would violate the
integrity of creation if the world were a deterministic mechanism governed by the laws of classical physics. For in order for God to act in a
Newtonian world, God would have to break or suspend the operation of
natural laws. Polkinghorne views the Newtonian world as a "closed"
and "rigid" structure wherein at any given time all events are pre-determined to occur by the laws of nature and the state of the universe at any
given time in the past. The Newtonian world is therefore not "open" to
special divine activity of a non-invasive sort - for any such activity
would entail God's tampering with some deterministic law or laws in
order to bring about what otherwise would not have occurred had this
law or these laws been in force.
Two comments are in order here. First, ironically enough, Newton
and other mechanistic philosophers saw in their mechanical philosophy
precisely a way to understand how God might be active in the world.
For these mechanistic philosophers saw the Aristotelian world as a world
closed to divine action in virtue of natural substances exercising their
causal powers in a way they thought detracts from divine sovereignty.
Occasionally, some of these natural philosophers even opted for a voluntarist understanding of the laws of Nature, according to which naturallaws simply specify how God usually acts. They would not then have
the kind of autonomy that Polkinghorne envisions the laws of classical
mechanics having. Polkinghorne would probably not find compelling,
however, such an understanding of a law of nature, first, because it
would give insufficient significance to the world as an "other" with
which God relates, and second, because the scientist on this view would
not be getting at the underlying structure of God's "other" so much as
understanding the divine will- how God usually acts. 1S
My second comment is that Polkinghorne apparently rejects a possibility that was very much a live option for Isaac Newton himself, namely, that God's special action be through the operation of (deterministic)
natural laws. For example, Newton considered the possibility that God
might "arrange for" the appearance of comets at propitious moments in
order to preserve the stability of the solar system, adjustments that
would not require any laws of mechanics to be broken. Indeed, I believe
that Polkinghorne designed his model in order to devise an alternative
to such a notion, perhaps because it fails to give sufficient significance to
the world as God's "other" with a freedom to "go its own way." The
notion of "special providence" as "arrangement" and especially "prearrangement" is too manipulative, a notion of providence unworthy of
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the respect God has for God's "other." Polkinghorne's model thus provides an alternative to God's special activity violating natural laws on
the one hand, and requiring "arrangement" or "pre-arrangement" on
the other.
We have seen how Polkinghorne argues that God could exploit the
indeterministic openness of chaotic systems in order to act in the world
without need for "pre-arrangement" or miraculous intervention. My
first objection to this model of divine action is that it is by no means clear
that chaotic systems are indeterministic. Indeed, the standard analysis of
them has it that they are deterministic, but in a manner which leaves
them exquisitely sensitive to external fluctuations on the one hand, and
on the other, impossible to predict over the long term based on any reasonable knowledge of their state at any time "t." In order to argue that
they are indeterministic, the case has to be made for their being qualitatively different from other classical systems that do not show this sensitivity. I do not think this case has been made, although there are interesting philosophical questions here, the most important being, how does
one adjudicate a dispute over the kind of causality - deterministic or
indeterministic - occurring in a dynamical system? To discuss these
issues in detail would take us too far afield. 16
Questions about indeterminism aside, however, the chief problem
with the model follows from the fact that as "emergent," a downwardlyacting causal power is embodied in the system out of whose microstructure the power emerges. By "embodied" I mean that the causal
power is ontologically dependent on (i.e., is sustained by) the very
micro-structure upon which it acts. Indeed, it is through this very
dependence that the emergent power gains access to lower ontological
levels in order to effect change there without "miraculously intervening," as it were, in the processes occurring at these levels. Hence, I argue
that for Polkinghorne's model to "work" as a model of God's action in
the world, God would have to be emergent from and thereby embodied
in the world, a relationship between God and the world that
Polkinghorne rightly rejects as incompatible with the Christian doctrine
of creationY
Another British scientist-theologian, Arthur Peacocke, has developed
an alternative model that, while exploiting the concept of downward
causation, does not entail that God is ontologically dependent on the
world. According to this model, rather than acting downwardly in the
world, God interacts with the state-of-the-universe-as-a-whole (SOTUAA W). The SOTUAAW is the most all-encompassing state possible, one
that Peacocke envisions as emerging from the interactions between entities at every ontological level in the universe. As emergent, this wholistic
state exerts downward causal influence throughout the universe at all
ontological levels. God interacts with this universal wholistic state in
such a way that the SOTUAAW in turn exerts its downward causal
influence in order to bring about those states of affairs God desires.
Although the model thus avoids any ontological dependence of God on
the world, it fails to accomplish its primary task of suggesting how God
acts in the world without intervening in the operation of natural laws.
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For it is difficult to see how God might interact with the SOTUAAW
without somehow interfering with the laws governing this universal,
wholistic state: God would act "on" the world in this case rather than
"in" it. Therefore, if one is willing to admit that God can intervene here
at this upper-most level in the universe, I do not see why one should
object to divine intervention at any other ontological level. The introduction of downward causation here is therefore superfluous. 18
To summarize the argument to this point, Polkinghorne's model for
divine action aims to suggest how God might act in special ways in the
world without violating natural laws. I have argued that his model
either entails that God is ontologically dependent on the world, or if
constructed along the lines Arthur Peacocke suggests, fails to show how
God's special activity does not interfere with natural laws. I pass then to
consider one of the most important aims for Polkinghorne's model of
divine action. That is, in response to the problem of evil, the model
should suggest how God's activity in the world is constrained, with the
result that God cannot act in all situations and circumstances in order to
prevent or otherwise lessen the impact of evil. For if God acts downwardly in the world, then God cannot accomplish all that God could
accomplish if God directly intervened in the world.
Like many, I think the problem of evil is the most serious problem
confronting the theologian pondering God's action in the world, and
therefore I am open to suggestions from any quarter which might
address this problem. I do not believe, however, that Polkinghorne's
model for divine action helps in this respect.
First, the success of his proposal regarding the problem of evil can be
no stronger than the plausibility of his model for divine action. I have
already indicated why I think this model fails to accomplish its first primary task: to suggest how God is specially active in the world without
interfering with natural laws.
Second, although the model provides for constraints on divine activity, it cannot specify how the mechanism for divine agency restricts what
God can accomplish in the world in any given situation, not even in general terms. Hence, on the basis of the model, one can only say that God is
constrained by the mechanism of divine action in the world, but one cannot specify how God is so constrained in any given instance. Where does
this put us regarding the problem of evil? I submit, not significantly
beyond where we were before developing the model. For it must already
be supposed that there were some constraints on God's activity, namely,
God's goodness, God's wisdom, and God's desire to bring all human
beings freely into union with Godself - and in no specific case can it be
understood how these constraints limit God's activity. It is not clear to
me therefore how the claim that God is constrained by the mechanism of
God's agency helps any further to reduce the force of the problem of evil.
VII

I close by reflecting on the most fundamental issue at hand, that of
specifying, if possible, the "causal joint" between God and the world.
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Polkinghorne argues that the joint depends on certain physical conditions
obtaining in the world, namely, that there exist "flexible" indeterministic
processes in which God can maneuver, as it were. Is this a promising
way to approach the problem of special divine action? Polkinghorne has
repeatedly denied that indeterministic processes constitute "gaps" in the
scientific account of the world, at least in the nineteenth-century sense of
the concept. I agree: the model does not require that a given phenomenon like biological adaptation remain scientifically inexplicable.
However, note that his model is quite dependent on there being indeterministic processes, especially macroscopic ones. Hence, although no scientific discovery could in this case undermine his model in the way that
Darwin's theory undermined special creation, any discovery or theoretical development that suggested that chaotic systems, or even quantum
systems, are not indeterministic would at very least count against his
model. This seems to me an unhealthy, even unacceptable, relationship
between science and theology, for in this case a scientific discovery
could cast doubt on whether in principle God can act in the world. 19
The way for Polkinghorne to avoid this consequence would be to
reject the very idea of constructing a model of special divine action that
specifies the physical conditions that must obtain if God is to act in the
world. The alternative is to recognize that because the divine act of creation itself is not a physical act, i.e., one that presupposes pre-existing
material, but rather a bringing forth ex nihilo of all that exists outside of
God, then the causal joint between God and the world is metaphysical in
nature, located "behind" or "under" the physical world open to scientific investigation. One could then assert that God's action in the world is
analogous to wholistic downward action within chaotic systems - if
indeed there exists such a mode of causation - without further claiming
that divine action actually exploits physical indeterminism. The analogy
would thereby suggest what the relationship between God and the
world is "like," but only given the fundamental metaphysical proviso derived from the doctrine of creaton ex nilzilo - that God's being and
God's power to act do not depend on or derive from the world. It is this
metaphysical proviso that strictly limits how this or any other analogy
for divine action can be exploited by, for example, ruling out the search
for the physical mode of causation that divine action exploits. Despite
this limitation, though, the analogy under consideration here does do
some work, for it suggests that the causal joint between God and world,
albeit "behind" or "under" the physical world and hence not physical in
nature, is "more like" the causal joint between a wholistic, downwardly
active causal power and its sustaining microstructure than is the causal
joint between, for example, two billiard balls colliding with each other.
The analogy thus helps us better to grasp the metaphysical relationship
between the Creator and the creation in which the Creator acts by illustrating something of what is meant by "non-invasive divine activity,"
although that relationship itself is in principle beyond the power of the
natural sciences to locate or investigate. 2')
By using what I am calling the "metaphysical proviso" to limit how
the analogy between divine action and downward causation is used, one
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builds a stronger, and I believer more proper buffer between scientific
discovery and the credibility of the fundamental religious belief that
God acts in the world. For I believe that the claim that God transcends
the world as its creator renders highly suspect attempts like
Polkinghorne's to argue that God must exploit a built-in physical feature
of the world in order to act in the world. Hence, no discovery about the
mode of causation obtaining in a given kind of physical system can put
belief in divine action at risk. This places the burden of the debate about
divine action squarely where it ought to rest, on the struggle to interpret
the human experience of death and rebirth that Christians understand in
terms of the God who creates and who saves. 21
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